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On Wang Hui’s Re-Imagination of Asia and Europe
RALPH WEBER
Abstract
For roughly two decades now, WANG HUI has been a prominent voice within academic, cultural and political discourses in China, but incre-
asingly also in Europe and the United States. WANG’s still developing oeuvre might be understood as an attempt to ‘provincialize Europe’ 
(DIPESH CHAKRABARTY) from a political perspective and by drawing on historical and present-day China. In this article, the main focus is on 
one specifi c aspect in this attempt, namely WANG’s view of Europe, and I shall investigate that aspect on the basis of an article by WANG on the 
concept of Asia: “The Politics of Imagining Asia” (2007). I fi rst discuss WANG’s genealogical analysis of Asia as a “European concept” before 
attending to what he perceives as derivations of it in Asia itself. I then engage with WANG’s proposal to go beyond the framework of nation-state/
empire, and argue that he fails to offer an attractive re-imagination of the concept of Asia. When fi nally turning to his view of Europe, I shall 
issue a criticism of some misplaced anti-Eurocentrism in his work on the conceptual level. 
Wang Hui, anti-Eurocentrism, concepts, Europe, Asia
Zusammenfassung
Über die von Wang Hui entwickelte Re-Imagination Asiens und Europas
Seit nunmehr fast zwei Jahrzehnten ist Wang HUI in den wissenschaftlichen, kulturellen und politischen Diskussionen in China, zunehmend 
aber auch in Europa und in den Vereinigten Staaten, eine prominente Stimme. Die von WANG entwickelte Vorstellung könnte als ein Versuch 
der „Provinzialisierung Europas” (Dipesh CHAKRABARTY) in politischer Hinsicht und in Bezug auf das historische und heutige China verstan-
den werden. Der Schwerpunkt dieses Artikels liegt auf einem spezifi schen Aspekt dieses Versuchs, und zwar auf WANGS Sichtweise von Euro-
pa. Diesen Aspekt untersucht der Autor auf der Grundlage eines Artikels von WANG über den Begriff Asien: “The Politics of Imagining Asia” 
(Die Politik der Imagination Asiens) (2007). Zunächst diskutiert der Autor WANGS genealogische Analyse Asiens als „Europäischen Begriff”, 
bevor er auf Abweichungen von diesem Begriff in Asien selbst eingeht. Danach setzt sich der Autor mit WANGS Vorschlag auseinander, über den 
Rahmen des Nationalstaates/Reiches hinauszugehen, und weist darauf hin, dass WANG keine attraktive Re-Imagination des Begriffs von Asien 
anbietet. Wenn der Autor abschließend auf WANGS Sicht von Europa eingeht, kritisiert er einen gewissen deplazierten Anti-Eurozentrismus 
in dessen Arbeit auf begriffl icher Ebene. 
Wang Hui, Anti-Eurozentrismus, Begriffe, Europa, Asien
In his new preface to Provincializing Eu-
rope, DIPESH CHAKRABARTY writes that 
“there must be many different locations 
[…] from which one could provincialize 
Europe with different results.”1 For CHA-
KRABARTY, unlike Marxist scholarship in 
which “the ‘local’ is a surface phenome-
non of social life [and], in the ultimate 
analysis, some kind of an effect of capi-
tal”, locations and places clearly matter.2 
This is not to say that he is anti-Marxist. 
He himself argues for the importance of 
the local precisely by offering a “selec-
tive but close reading of Marx”.3 CHAK-
RABARTY embraces Marxist claims regar-
1 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. xviii.
2 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. xvi.
3 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. 47.
ding the universality of capitalism. It is 
the very kind of universalistic thinking 
which underlies what he calls History 1, 
i.e. “the past posited logically by the ca-
tegory ‘capital’.”4 Yet, taken by itself and 
as the only kind of thinking applicable to 
social life, it “evacuates all lived sense of 
place assigning it to what is assumed to 
be a deeper and a more determining le-
vel, the level at which the capitalist mode 
of production creates abstract space.”5 
CHAKRABARTY quotes Marx as saying that 
capital also encounters “antecedents” not 
4 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. 63. An example, which Chakra-
barty off ers, is the necessary severance of the connec-
tion between land/tool and labourers, without which 
workers cannot be available to capital in the fi rst place.
5 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. xvii.
“established by itself, not as forms of its 
own life-process.”6 In CHAKRABARTY’s 
view, Marx thus anticipates the relevan-
ce of singular and unique histories of 
places, but fails to develop the point. 
Places and their histories, however, 
are crucial for the idea of provincializing 
Europe from different locations. These 
are the histories “that capital anywhe-
re – even in the West – encounters as 
its antecedents”.7 CHAKRABARTY refers 
6 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. 63. In German: „… nicht als von 
ihm gesetzte Voraussetzungen, nicht als Formen seines 
eignen Lebensprozesses.“ See: Karl Marx, MEW 26.3, p. 
460. Marx’s examples are “money circulation” (Geld-
zirkulation) and “commodity” (Ware), both of which 
do not necessarily belong to capital’s life process or to 
the past.
7 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. 69.
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to them as History 2s. Their function is 
constantly to interrupt “the totalizing 
thrusts of History 1,” i.e. capital’s att-
empt “to subjugate or destroy the multip-
le possibilities that belong to History 2.”8 
No global capital, in CHAKRABARTY’s 
words, “… can ever represent the univer-
sal logic of capital, for any historically 
available form of capital is a provisional 
compromise made up of History 1 modi-
fi ed by somebody’s History 2s. The uni-
versal, in that case, can only exist as a 
place holder, its place always usurped by 
a historical particular seeking to present 
itself as the universal”.9
Hence, when CHAKRABARTY, for in-
stance, sets out to investigate Bengali 
modernity by drawing up an affective 
narrative of human belonging around the 
social practice of adda, he is translating 
into his Marxist categories “the existing 
archives of thought and practices about 
human relations in the subcontinent,” 
but is wholly aware that this also means 
to “modify these thoughts and practices 
with the help of these categories.”10
It takes not much to see that WANG HUI 
(1959*) – a scholar of Chinese intellectu-
al history, a fi gurehead of the New Left 
and one of the most prominent intellectu-
als in contemporary China – shares some 
suffi ciently similar discursive space with 
CHAKRABARTY so that the former might 
easily be understood as an ally in the 
latter’s effort to provincialize Europe.11 
For instance, WANG draws on similar his-
torical and philosophical scholarship to 
refl ect on global capitalism and local his-
tories (such as the coming about of sin-
gle aspects of ‘Chinese modernity’, e.g. 
the scientifi c worldview or taxonomies 
of knowledge). Also WANG insists that 
these local histories, and for that reason 
8 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, pp. 65-66.
9 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. 70.
10 CHAKRABARTY, 2008, p. 71.
11 A participant in the protests on Tiananmen Square in 
1989, WANG HUI had to undergo one year of compulsory 
re-education. Besides his political engagement in the 
New Left (a label which he does not endorse partly 
because it sparks unwelcome associations with the 
Cultural Revolution and partly because it is a ‘Western’ 
term), he became prominent as co-editor (1996-2007) 
of the infl uential monthly literary journal Dushu 读书. 
He was a fellow at the prestigious Wissenschaftskolleg 
zu Berlin and a guest professor in New York (at New 
York University and at Columbia University), Tokyo and 
Heidelberg. In 2008, the magazines Foreign Policy and 
Prospect listed him as one of the world’s top 100 public 
intellectuals, notably as a “political theorist” (May/
June, 61). He is a research professor at the School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences at Qinghua University 
in Beijing.
also the present, cannot be adequately 
understood only within the framework 
of European modernity (i.e. capitalism, 
liberal democracy and the nation-state), 
which is itself a local framework and a 
historical form. 
Yet in spite of all similarities WANG 
very clearly occupies and writes from 
a very different location than CHAKRA-
BARTY does. His four-volume The Rise of 
Modern Chinese Thought has been wide-
ly acclaimed as a landmark publication, 
and is intriguing in its historical and 
epistemic scope as well as theoretical 
ambition.12 In ZHANG YONGLE’s opinion, 
it “can be safely said that nothing compa-
rable to WANG HUI’s work has appeared 
in China since the late Qing-early Repu-
blican period.”13 His developing oeuvre, 
generally speaking, is on the location(s) 
of China, its history and modernity, and 
its present condition in an age of neo-
liberalism and the ‘war on terror’.14 And 
writing from a different location may, 
as CHAKRABARTY suggests, also mean 
to arrive at different results. It is in this 
spirit and to this end that I seek to enga-
ge WANG’s work and to assess his view 
of Europe. I do so from a philosophical 
perspective that is interested in concepts, 
which is both a perspective and an inte-
rest different from WANG’s, but I think 
one that might profi tably contribute to 
scholarship on Wang’s work.
What I would like to suggest is that 
WANG’s view of Europe may fi nd one of 
its best expressions not in his scattered 
comments on Europe, but in an article of 
his which deals with the concept of Asia 
and, by implication, with the concept 
of Europe. The article is entitled “The 
Politics of Imagining Asia: A Genealo-
gical Analysis” and has been published 
in 2007.15 WANG’s view of Europe is thus 
approached through an examination of 
his concept of Europe and of what he 
takes to be “European concepts” in this 
article. I proceed in four steps. First, 
WANG’s genealogical analysis of Asia as a 
“European concept” is discussed. I then 
follow up derivations of that concept in 
12 WANG, 2008a. For academic discussions in English, 
see: Murthy, 2006; Wang Ban, 2007; Huang, 2008; and 
especially Zhang 2010, which off ers several forceful 
criticisms. 
13 ZHANG, 2010, p. 71.
14 See: WANG, 2003; WANG 2009.
15 WANG, 2007. The subject-matter of the article is dis-
cussed in more detail in Chinese in the second appen-
dix of Wang 2008a, pp. 1531-1608.
Asia itself as WANG fi nds it in the work 
of several Japanese sinologists, Lenin, 
and Sun Yat-sen. In a next step, WANG’s 
proposal of a political perspective beyond 
the nation-state is critically assessed with 
a view to how his concept of Asia relates 
to place. Although Europe will be present 
as a topic throughout the article, I address 
it explicitly only in the concluding step, 
when the consequences of WANG’s re-
imagination of Asia on his view of Eu-
rope are examined. It will become clear 
that WANG views Europe mainly as an ori-
ginator of concepts, which dominate the 
new imperial neo-liberal order and which 
only for the reason of their verbalization 
and use in 19th century European history 
he understands as defi nitely “European 
concepts”. I will object to this conceptual 
anti-Eurocentrism, which I fi nd philoso-
phically problematic and which motivates 
esoteric political arguments of presumed 
traditional or cultural internality.16  
It is important to be clear from the 
outset that WANG is here not understood 
as representative of China’s intellectuals. 
His view is not ‘the Chinese view on Eu-
rope’. One of the broader aims of this pa-
per is precisely to show that while a view 
from nowhere is impossible, assertions 
of views from somewhere are all too 
possible, but highly problematic, as they 
easily turn on what are doubtful or undue 
simplifi cations (as when a view suddenly 
becomes the view). Given the diversity 
in the intellectual landscape of contem-
porary China, it seems clear that no one 
person could lay claim to such repre-
sentativity. Even to call WANG’s view ‘a 
Chinese view on Europe’ is problematic, 
for precisely what does one mean by the 
adjective ‘Chinese’ and why should that 
matter? It is because I would not know 
how to answer this question that I shall 
confi ne myself to assess ‘WANG’s view 
of Europe’, which in some sense perhaps 
might be fancied as a Chinese view, but 
surely also is much more than that.
16 WANG’S work has recently been the topic of heated 
discussion over accusations of plagiarism, as to the ac-
curacy of which I cannot say anything – yet I should like 
to point out that such accusations in the complicated 
political situation in the People’s Republic of China of 
course might express concern about scholarly stan-
dards, but are more likely to be a pretence for political 
manoeuvres, particularly given Wang’s involvement in 
Chinese intellectual discussions. I should be clear that 
my criticism of WANG’S work in this article is not to play 
into the hands of those interested in such manoeuv-
ring. In fact, I believe that my criticism is a forceful one, 
whatever may be the case in terms of plagiarism as well 
as in terms of politically motivated accusations.      
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Asia as a “European concept”
WANG HUI is usually translated as trea-
ting the words ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ va-
riously as labels, categories, notions, 
ideas or concepts. In his Chinese wri-
tings, he uses categories ( fanchou 范畴) 
and concepts (gainian 概念) largely 
synonymously. Despite the vagueness 
introduced by this practice, it is clear 
that, in WANG’s work, there is more to 
‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ than the seemingly 
innocent denotation of two geographical 
regions by means of proper names. For 
the purposes of this article, I consistent-
ly take these words to indicate either the 
proper name of geographical regions or 
some kind of concept. To understand 
how proper names are transformed into 
concepts, one may want to think of ex-
pressions such as ‘Singapore is Asia’s 
Switzerland’ or ‘Mopti is the Venice of 
Africa’. In the latter statement, the city 
of Venice is conceptualized by imputa-
tion of a quality, say, the one of ‘being 
built on water’, the point of which pre-
cisely consists in it not being applicable 
to Venice only. Venice thus becomes a 
concept and is readily applied to many 
Venices, of the West (Nantes), the North 
(Hamburg, Stockholm, Amsterdam, Bir-
mingham, etc.) and the East (Suzhou). 
By the same token, Asia and Europe may 
be understood as concepts standing for 
one or another quality of ‘being Asian’ 
or ‘being European’, which by itself con-
veys little meaning but requires further 
paraphrase. 
Concepts such as Asia and Europe 
seem to depend much – and much more 
or more clearly than other concepts – on 
language and linguistic practices. This 
makes it especially troublesome (and in 
many cases outright impossible) to di-
stinguish between concept and word. 
Concepts of this kind are part of larger 
and shifting vocabularies, resist defi niti-
on, and are further distinguished by the 
fact that they are “bearers of multiple 
‘meanings’ at any given time”.17 They 
have been continuously and variously 
crafted by the imaginations of innume-
rable language-users – and have been put 
to many a use and purpose. Such craf-
ting and use-making reveals an impor-
tant political dimension. Recognition of 
that dimension suggests an investigation 
into the genealogies of Asia and Europe, 
17 GEUSS, 2001, p. 7.
i.e. the writing of a story of their crafting 
and uses with a special focus on power 
relations and exertions. And this is pre-
cisely what WANG HUI offers in his article 
“The politics of imagining Asia” – pri-
marily for the concept of Asia but, by 
implication, also for the one of Europe. 
WANG’s genealogical analysis of Asia 
takes its starting-point in Europe and in 
fact reads across large sections much like 
a ‘European history of ideas’. Thus he 
writes that “historically speaking”, the 
concept of Asia “is not Asian but, rather, 
European.”18 Particularly in the 18th and 
19th centuries, the concepts of Asia and 
Europe underwent considerable and las-
ting changes through the twin movement 
of new imaginaries emerging during the 
European Enlightenment and the tighte-
ning grip of European colonialism. The 
resulting concepts indicated a determi-
ning contrast at the core of European 
modernity and were the product of a new 
system of knowledge. WANG speaks of 
a “new worldview in every aspect” and 
mentions the burgeoning disciplines of 
“historical linguistics, race theory, mo-
dern geography, political economy, the-
ories of state, legal philosophy, the study 
of religion, and historiography.”19 19th 
century scholars working on these to-
pics, he claims, all in one way or another 
embraced teleological views of history 
and on that basis advanced a “univer-
salist narrative of European modernity” 
around the three central themes of “em-
pire, nation-state and capitalism.”20
But the self-image of Europe as the 
engine of ‘universal progress’, WANG 
explains, needed to be brought to terms 
with newly acquired insights such as 
the one by linguists into the historical 
links between the European langua-
ges and Sanskrit. Asia, in 19th centu-
ry European texts, was thus presented 
as the starting point of world history. 
But how could Europe derive from 
Asia and at the same time fi nd itself at 
such a different stage of development? 
WANG quotes Hegel who is reported in 
his lectures on the philosophy of histo-
ry to have spoken of the “so dissimilar 
development of what had been origi-
18 WANG, 2007, p. 2.
19 WANG, 2007, p. 4.
20 WANG, 2007, p. 4.
nally related”.21 WANG also emphasizes 
the “internal relations” of Hegel’s and 
Smith’s depiction of stages in world his-
tory.22 Stages in both authors are linked 
to taxonomies of regions and peoples 
and embedded in chronological narrati-
ves. Yet, while Smith takes the “market 
mode as both the result of historical 
development and the inner law of his-
tory”, Hegel incorporates these econo-
mic factors into a “political framework 
concerning the state”, which in the end 
becomes the main standard for evalua-
ting the different stages.23 WANG’s ge-
nealogical analysis shows that Asia and 
Europe are hence presented as “two 
correlated organic parts of the same 
historical process”, but at the same 
time “occupy two drastically different 
stages in this historical continuum.”24 
And at the bottom of this diachronism, 
still in WANG’s analysis, lurks the issue 
of state-formation. Asia had not yet de-
veloped states and thus not formed his-
torical subjects. Were that to happen, 
i.e. the transition from empire to state, 
then Asia would no longer be Asian, as 
WANG succinctly puts it.
In sum, 19th century European con-
structions of the concept of Asia accor-
ding to WANG exhibit the following traits: 
multi-national empires, political despo-
tism, and nomadic and agrarian modes 
of production. Under the premise of a 
teleological view of history with the Eu-
ropean nation-state and the expansion of 
the capitalist market system as its telos, 
Asia was consequently constructed as 
located at a backward stage. WANG wri-
tes: “In this context, Asia was not only a 
geographic category, but also a form of 
civilization: Asia represented a political 
form defi ned in opposition to the Euro-
pean nation-state, a social form defi ned 
21 WANG, 2007, p. 4. In the original German: „die zu-
gleich so disparate Ausbildung einer uranfänglichen 
Verwandtschaft”, in: G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Geschichte, Einleitung.
22 WANG writes: „Because his account of civil society, 
market and commerce derives from the Scottish school 
of political economy, Hegel’s notion of a despotic Asia 
is linked to a certain economic system. If we contrast 
Hegel’s historical philosophical account of the four 
stages – the Orient, Greece, Rome and the Teutonic 
peoples, with Adam Smith’s delineation, from the per-
spective of economic history, of four historical stages – 
hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and commercial, it is not 
diffi  cult to discover internal relations between Hegel’s 
historical description centered on political forms 
and Smith’s historical stages centered on productive 
forms.“ See: WANG, 2007, p. 5.
23 WANG, 2007, p. 5.
24 WANG, 2007, p. 4.
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in opposition to European capitalism, 
and a transitional stage between prehis-
tory and history proper.”25
For WANG, Asia “or China” (as he 
most tellingly adds) in Montesquieu, He-
gel and Marx develop on the basis of an 
imaginary of a contrasting civilization. 
To construct Asia in this way, “it was 
necessary to elide its internal develop-
ment and change”. In this imaginary, 
Asia becomes a static historical form 
that displays eternal characteristics and 
thus quintessentially is void of any his-
tory of its own. It hence is thought of as 
lacking the “historical conditions or im-
petus for producing modernity” on the 
basis of “the ‘state’ and its legal system, 
its urban and commercial way of life, or 
its mechanism for economic and milita-
ry competition based on nation-states.”26 
It is this imaginary to which WANG ob-
jects, and which leads him to set out to 
re-imagine Asia.
Asian derivations of Asia
The fatal opposition of empire and state 
for WANG is the key to any understan-
ding of history and global capitalism and 
also for the further ramifi cations of the 
concept of Asia in Asia. WANG sees two 
dominant derivations of the concept in 
Asia. One of these derivations prompts 
WANG to propose a new reading of the 
Meiji Japanese ‘theory of shedding Asia’. 
The other manifests itself in the social re-
volutionary visions of agricultural capi-
talism in Lenin and Sun Yat-sen. In fact, 
the claims that go with WANG’s argument 
are strong and surely questionable. But 
their validity is not primarily what is at 
issue here. His claims in any event illust-
rate the enormous infl uence he attributes 
to the question of traditional or cultural 
internality vs. externality, and give us an 
access point into one important aspect of 
his view of Europe. 
WANG begins his analysis of the Ja-
panese case by quoting Takeuchi Yo-
shimi (1910-1977), who in a 1948 ar-
ticle on “What is modernity?” wrote: 
“[If we want to] understand East Asia 
(Jpn. Tōyō), [we must appreciate that] 
what constitute Asia are European fac-
tors existing in Europe. Asia is Asia 
by dint of its European context.”27 This 
view fi nds itself in somewhat more nega-
25 WANG, 2007, p. 4.
26 WANG, 2007, p. 5.
27 WANG, 2007, p. 2.
tive terms already in Fukuzawa Yukichi 
(1835-1901) and his call to ‘shed Asia’ 
of 1885 (later expanded into the slogan 
‘shed Asia and join Europe’). Asia in 
this slogan in WANG’s view includes two 
references, one to “a region with a high 
degree of cultural homogenization, i.e. 
Confucian Asia”, and one, on more po-
litical terms, to the “China-centered im-
perial relations”.28 The shedding of Asia 
in this context implied the construction 
of a European-style nation-state and in-
voked a cluster of terms such as ‘free-
dom’, ‘human rights’, ‘national sove-
reignty’, ‘civilization’, and ‘independent 
spirit’. From this perspective, Asia is 
actually thought of as “internal to Euro-
pean thought” and the proposals to ‘shed 
Asia’, as WANG writes, “derive from the 
nineteenth-century European concep-
tion of ‘world history’.”29 The analogy 
on which WANG’s strong claim rests is 
the following: “Just as European self-
consciousness required knowledge of its 
‘outside’, ‘shedding Asia’ was a way of 
forming self-consciousness through dif-
ferentiating Japan from Asia. From this 
perspective, ‘shedding Asia’, this propo-
sal of early modern Japanese particula-
rism, in fact derived from early modern 
European historical consciousness. In 
other words, Japanese particularism de-
rived from European universalism.”30
The questionability of the claim, I 
would submit, is in notions such as “Eu-
ropean self-consciousness” and “Euro-
pean universalism” for it is unclear whe-
ther the weighty act of differentiating an 
outside is particularly tied to the histo-
rical formation of European self-con-
sciousness or proper to just any forming 
of self-consciousness. For WANG, there 
is indeed evidence for that this Japanese 
Asia is by and large a replication of the 
European Asia. Drawing on Perry An-
derson, WANG seeks to illustrate how the 
contrast between European nation-states 
and Asian empires (as in Machiavelli, 
Bodin and Montesquieu) fi nds itself in 
much a similar fashion in the self-under-
standing of Meiji Japan as “the contrast 
between a single-ethnicity Japan, muta-
ting from feudalism to a modern state, 
and a multi-ethnicity China, trapped in 
Confucian empire systems.”31
28 WANG, 2007, p. 3.
29 WANG, 2007, p. 3.
30 WANG, 2007, p. 3.
31 WANG, 2007, p. 6.
To conceive Asian modernity as an out-
come of European modernity is also a 
pattern that WANG detects in a second 
derivation of the European construction 
of Asia along the binary state-empire 
and that he sees exemplifi ed in Lenin’s 
writings. Lenin of course took Russia 
to be an Asian country, but, as WANG 
comments, “this orientation is not defi -
ned from the perspective of geography 
but from the degree of capitalist de-
velopment and the process of Russian 
history.”32 The creation of conditions for 
an agricultural capitalism, the appropria-
te and necessary next step for China and 
Russia, hinged on its being closely tied to 
the nation-state. WANG quotes Lenin as 
saying that “the national state is the rule 
and the ‘norm’ of capitalism; the multi-
national state represents backwardness, 
or is an exception.”33 In WANG’s analysis, 
Lenin’s Asia is not unlike Smith’s Asia 
or Hegel’s Asia, i.e. largely without a 
history of its own and, in Lenin’s words, 
“standing still for centuries.”34 
WANG’s genealogy of Asia really 
culminates in the work of Sun Yat-sen, 
which is also the part where WANG’s ge-
nealogical analysis turns into a more ex-
plicit presentation of his own arguments. 
Although the European Asia is still partly 
present in the prominence Sun accords to 
the nation-state, in WANG’s analysis Sun 
eventually transcends the framework of 
state-empire to lead the way to the con-
ditions for formation of the ‘active sub-
ject’ in revolutionary politics. In Sun’s 
proposal of ‘Great Asianism’, WANG 
fi nds two contrasting Asias: “one was the 
‘birthplace of the most ancient culture,’ 
but which lacked ‘a completely indepen-
dent state’; the other was the Asia about 
to be rejuvenated.”35 This rejuvenation 
in Sun’s opinion had to follow the ex-
ample of Japan insofar as it had become 
the fi rst independent state in Asia. Sun’s 
vision of Asia was one that stretched all 
the way from Japan to Turkey and that 
contained independent nation-states. 
WANG appends two important qualifi ca-
tions, which signal Sun’s transcendence 
of the European-derived framework of 
state-empire. First, these looming Asian 
nations were to be outcomes of “natio-
nal independence movements and not an 
32 WANG, 2007, p. 8.
33 WANG, 2007, p. 10.
34 WANG, 2007, p. 11.
35 WANG, 2007, p. 12.
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awkward imitation of European nation-
states”, because they were carrying with 
them an Asian culture based on the prin-
ciple of the kingly way (wang dao 王 道) 
and opposed to the hegemonic way (ba 
dao 霸道). The former was part and par-
cel of Sun’s Asia, while the latter he saw 
embodied in Europe. Secondly, and in 
WANG’s view despite the Confucian ori-
gin of the distinction between kingly and 
hegemonic ways, Sun’s Asia does not 
build upon some core of cultural homo-
geneity, neither Confucian nor other, but 
rather upon cultural heterogeneity, i.e. a 
“political culture that accommodates dif-
ferent religions, beliefs, nations, and so-
cieties”; the “category of nation provides 
the vehicle for the heterogeneity inherent 
in the idea of Asia.”36 In the writings of 
Sun, national self-determination weighs 
strongly but is balanced by an interna-
tionalism that is as much based on an 
alliance of the masses as it is on nation-
states.37 Sun’s Asia, it seems, would have 
to be a combination of the pluralism of 
the tributary model, socialism, and the 
new relations among nation-states. 
A political perspective beyond the 
nation-state and Asia
Returning to CHAKRABARTY’s distinc-
tion between History 1 and History 2 
and recalling the close connection bet-
ween capital(ism) and the nation-state in 
WANG’s account, one might be tempted to 
understand the emphasis on the pluralis-
tic tributary model in the face of the new 
historical conditions of nation-states as a 
version of History 2. In Sun and Lenin, 
WANG sees formulated “a revolutionary 
perspective on Asia’s social characteris-
tics”, and in some interpretative state-
ments he indeed seems to pit the histo-
rical particular against the universal lo-
gic of capital: “In this perspective, what 
makes Asia Asia is not any cultural es-
sence abstracted from Confucianism or 
any other type of civilization, but rather 
the special position of Asian countries in 
the capitalist world-system. The special 
position is not produced by a structural 
narrative of world capitalism, but by a 
dynamic analysis of the class composi-
tion and historical traditions internal to 
Asian society.”38
36 WANG, 2007, p. 12.
37 WANG, 2007, p. 13.
38 WANG, 2007, p. 14.
WANG claims his re-imagination of Asia 
to be different from those based on “va-
rious culturalisms, statisms, and theories 
of civilization that emerged from early 
modern history.”39 He accords Asia a 
“unique position” in the midst of world 
capitalism and imperialism. This unique-
ness stems from internal “social forces 
and their relations”, which become only 
visible once one adopts a social revoluti-
onary perspective and subjects internati-
onal relations and different societies to a 
dynamic and “political analysis.”40
To adopt a social revolutionary per-
spective means to embrace a “political 
perspective”, which according to WANG 
requires “both the placement of con-
scious subjects within this perspective 
and the discernment of various active 
subjects – discernment of friends and 
enemies, and assessment of the direc-
tion of social movements.”41 By thus 
discerning different “political forces 
within and among societies” along a 
Left-Schmittian line, WANG seeks to 
overcome the framework of statism and 
international relations.42 In particular, 
he opposes the vulgar view of equating 
the state with the political. From a social 
revolutionary perspective, “the political” 
exists beyond the state in various acti-
ve subjects. To equate the state with the 
political, however, since the late 1970s 
has become the standard perception of a 
reality which WANG much deplores and 
which to him denotes “an era of ‘depoli-
ticization,’ a process in which state me-
chanisms have gradually appropriated 
active subjectivity or subjective agency 
into ‘state rationality’ and the tracks of 
the global market.”43 
But given that this perspective can be 
applied to just any location, what would 
it mean to apply it to Asia? To what Asia? 
In other words, what is the relation of the 
location(s) of Asia to WANG’s concept 
of Asia? WANG opposes “essentialist 
39 WANG, 2007, p. 14.
40 WANG, 2007, p. 14.
41 WANG, 2007, p. 14.
42 WANG bases much of his discussion of ‘the political’ 
on Carl Schmitt. While he explicitly references and 
argumentatively draws on Schmitt’s The Concept of 
the Political and his Theory of the Partisan, it should be 
noted that he himself does not explicitly subscribe to 
the label of ‘Left-Schmittianism’. That label refers to 
a group of political theorists and philosophers (e.g. 
Chantal Mouff e, Gopal Balakrishnan) who use Carl 
Schmitt and the concept of ‘depoliticization’ for mark-
edly left-wing political ends.  
43 WANG, 2007, pp. 17-18. See also WANG 2002 and 2006.
perspectives in understanding and con-
structing ‘Asian’ identity”, particular-
ly those that exhibit “strong culturalist 
overtones”, such as the attempts to de-
lineate a unitary and modern East Asia 
by the Japanese Kyoto-school sinologists 
Nishijima Sadao (1919-1998) or Miyaz-
aki Ichisada (1901-1995).44 Their search 
for an Asian modernity, in WANG’s opi-
nion, results in historical narratives of 
East Asian history that merely reproduce 
the “inherent standards of the Hegelian 
world order” which they have set out to 
deconstruct. When Miyazaki argues for 
a Song Dynasty capitalism and thus for 
an East Asian early modernity, he con-
structs a historical narrative that esta-
blishes a parallel development with the 
West and thus rests trapped in teleolo-
gy and “various European concepts”.45 
WANG is more sympathetic to the more 
recent narrative offered by HAMASHITA 
TAKESHI who stipulates an “inner orga-
nicity” of Asia along a centre-periphery 
perspective and economic and political 
factors, particularly the maritime com-
mercial relations and distinctive tri-
butary networks.46 However, also that 
account in WANG’s view reproduces the 
binary of empire-state. For him, what is 
required is a narrative that includes wars 
and revolutions and a focus on continen-
tal relations besides maritime commer-
cial networks. For the tributary system 
is not “a simple economic relation”, but 
“encompasses ritual and political rela-
tions among various social groups with 
differing cultures and beliefs.”47 It can-
not be described along a hierarchical re-
lation between centre and periphery, but 
its complex meanings and uses point to 
a considerable “overlap or confl ict with 
modern capitalist relations.”48
WANG proposes a more entangled 
view of Asia and Europe, in which the 
question of Asia’s modernity and the re-
lationship between Asia and Europe is 
taking the communication and transpor-
44 WANG, 2007, pp. 18-19.
45 WANG, 2007, p. 19. In my view, all concepts should 
be universally available for historiographic purposes. 
Contra Wang, I would hold that one does not necessari-
ly see more or less using one or the other concept, but 
one sees diff erent things, which is not to say that all 
such eff orts should be equally valued.
46 WANG, 2007, p. 20. An English translation of 
Hamashita’s work has just appeared: Takeshi Hamashi-
ta, Trade and Finance in Late Imperial China: Maritime 
Customs and Open Port Market Zones, Singapore, 2010.
47 WANG, 2007, p. 25.
48 WANG, 2007, p. 25.
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tation not as “the stiff bundling together 
of two worlds”, but more like “two gears 
connected with a belt: when one turns, 
the other must turn as well.”49 Yet, still, 
what is the role of locations in his Asia? 
How to re-imagine Asia? WANG explains 
that in his vision of “an interactive nar-
rative of history, the validity of the idea 
of Asia diminishes, since it is neither a 
self-contained entity nor a set of self-
contained relations… [and] neither the 
beginning of a linear world history nor 
its end.”50 New imaginings of Asia, in 
WANG’s opinion, must provide space for 
considerable cultural and political plu-
rality and must heed “institutional ex-
periences common to Asian cultures”.51 
WANG’s talk of Asian cultural commo-
nality, however, remains undetermined, 
vague and eventually unsatisfying.52 
How would this concept of Asia relate 
to the geographical region Asia? Could 
it still possibly stretch from Japan to 
Turkey? WANG does mention one more 
commonality which, however, also fails 
to provide clarity: “The commonality of 
Asian imaginaries partly derives from 
the imaginers’ common subordinate 
states under European colonialism, the 
Cold War, and the present global order, 
and the trends of national self-determi-
nation, socialist, and democratization 
movements.”53
One wonders whether many African 
imaginaries could not claim much the 
same subordination. What about some 
European imaginaries (given inner-Eu-
ropean colonialism)? Does it in the end 
all hinge on a claim of continuing colo-
nialism?
Somehow and somewhere along the 
argument, WANG’s Asia seems to have 
become smaller and larger at the same 
time, more like East Asia or, rather, 
China on cultural terms and more like 
‘anything but not Europe’ in terms of 
subordination. There is clearly a tension 
in WANG’s work between on the one hand 
the acknowledgement of the cultural he-
terogeneity of Asia, East Asia, and even 
China and on the other hand a reliance on 
49 WANG, 2007, pp. 26-27.
50 WANG, 2007, p. 27.
51 WANG, 2007, p. 28.
52 The dissatisfaction is reinforced by the fact that in 
his The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought, WANG builds his 
argument on a cultural continuity along Confucian ritu-
al and morality. It is unclear how WANG’S Confucianism 
relates to his re-imagination of Asia.
53 WANG, 2007, p. 29.
a cultural continuity which WANG labels 
Confucian and which gives substance to 
his many claims of internality.54 Perhaps, 
the reason for all this is that WANG lacks 
CHAKRABARTY’s fi rm commitment to the 
universality of capital. Perhaps, as I will 
argue, there is still too much of a mis-
placed conceptual anti-Eurocentrism and 
reliance on a specifi c concept of Europe 
in WANG’s post-revolutionary vision.
Re-imagining Europe and conceptu-
al (anti-)Eurocentrism
Although WANG’s main concern is with 
the concept of Asia, he leaves no doubt 
that a re-imagination of that concept on 
the basis of an “interactive narrative of 
history” includes the re-examination of 
the concept of Europe.55 WANG’s concept 
of Europe, i.e. the quality which he impu-
tes to ‘being European’, seems largely to 
consist in his account of 19th century Eu-
ropean history and its proliferating use 
of concepts which he deems infl uential 
up to the present day. His re-imagination 
of Europe aims at challenging “Euro-
centrist historical narratives” and criti-
cizing “Eurocentrism” more generally.56 
WANG’s critique of Eurocentrism is hence 
intimately linked to contemporary poli-
tics, for his call to re-imagine Asia (and 
Europe) targets the lingering continuities 
of European colonialism as well as what 
he calls the new order of “neoliberal em-
pire/imperialism”. 
That ‘new empire’, in WANG’s view, 
has been a product of the ‘war on terror’ 
and “follows naturally upon the heels 
of neoliberal globalization.”57 Where-
as neoliberal globalization “seeks to 
restructure various social traditions” 
along “marketist principles such as the 
legal protection of private property, the 
state’s withdrawal from the economic 
sphere, and the transnationalization of 
productive, commercial, and fi nancial 
systems”, the ‘war on terror’ makes use 
of “violence, crises, and social disinteg-
ration” that come with neo-liberalism as 
“pretenses to reconstruct a military and 
54 See: WANG, 2007, p. 28; WANG, 2008b, p. 118 and p. 122.
55 WANG, 2007, p. 27.
56 WANG, 2007, pp. 28-29. WANG, for instance, fi nds 
“philosophical analysis of Song dynasty within the 
framework of ontology, realism, and epistemology” 
dissatisfying, for “such a method itself is external to 
Song thought; it is an interpretative system based on 
the concepts, categories, and theoretical frameworks 
of European philosophy.” See: WANG, 2008b, p. 118.
57 WANG, 2007, p. 1.
political ‘new empire’.”58 The aim of the 
‘new empire’ is no less than “the cons-
truction of a total order at all levels.”59 
The link between WANG’s criticisms of 
Eurocentrism and of the ‘new empire’ 
is manifest in the following quote: “The 
critique of Eurocentrism is not an affi r-
mation of Asiacentrism, but rather a re-
jection of that sort of egocentric, exclusi-
vist, and expansionist logic of dominati-
on. In this sense, revealing the disorder 
and plurality within the ‘new empire’, 
breaking open the taken-for-granted no-
tion of Europe, is not only one of the pre-
conditions for reconstructing the ideas of 
Asia and Europe, but also the necessary 
path for breaking out of the ‘new impe-
rial logic’.”60 
What to think of WANG’s re-imagina-
tion of Asia and Europe? WANG’s criti-
cism of Eurocentrist historiography and 
its Asian derivations is suggestive and 
his studies on the rise of modern Chine-
se thought, particularly his discussions 
of junxian zhi 郡县制 (“rational bureau-
cracy”), fengjian zhi 封建制 (“feudal 
system”), shishi 时势 (“the trend of 
times”) and tianli 天理 (“heavenly prin-
ciple”), offer rich conceptual resources 
for critical thought and for new avenues 
in historiography.61 He often presents 
these conceptual resources as internal 
to the Chinese tradition.62 In fact, as one 
commentator highlights, Confucianism, 
in WANG’s view, “did not wait for moder-
nity to have a self-critique of domination 
and inequality”.63 In the light of DIPESH 
CHAKRABARTY’s question in the opening 
pages of this journal about what “terms 
of criticism” the emerging superpowers 
of India and China will offer the victims 
of their domination, WANG’s work might 
thus be understood as a forceful answer 
(although WANG, as I said before, is not 
representative for China – and a fortiori 
not for the China presented in the imagi-
nary of a superpower).64 WANG’s answer, 
however, suffers from several problems, 
which need to be addressed.
58 Wang, 2007, p. 1.
59 WANG, 2007, p. 1.
60 WANG, 2007, p. 29.
61 Cf. WANG, 2008b, pp. 120-123.
62 He, for instance, repeatedly speaks of “Chinese 
traditional categories”. For an important qualifi cation, 
where WANG speaks out against “a simple reliance on 
traditional conceptions and paradigms”, see: WANG, 
2008b, p. 115.
63 WANG BAN, 2007, p. 226.
64 CHAKRABARTY, 2011.
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WANG’s call for re-imagining Asia and 
Europe in terms of criticism is a dou-
ble blow against the historiography of 
“world history” from the 19th century on-
wards and against the 21st century global 
political order, which he epitomizes as 
the “‘new imperial’ order and its logic”.65 
For WANG, these two matters are so 
closely related that the Eurocentrism in 
the former can only be part of the prob-
lem in the latter. Yet, and here comes the 
critical distinction I want to foreground, 
for WANG this seems to hold also at the 
conceptual level as regards both his-
toriography and political argument. In 
other words, there is a conceptual anti-
Eurocentrism in WANG’s work manifest 
in his talk and criticism of “European 
concepts” and in his search for and advo-
cacy of concepts and categories internal 
to the Chinese tradition. This seems phi-
losophically and politically problematic. 
In terms of philosophy, I think that an ar-
gument could be produced which would 
show that the notion of a “European 
concept” is either nonsensical or an in-
attentive shorthand to refer to some “Eu-
ropean” history of verbalized use of the 
concept in question. WANG’s emphasis on 
the 19th century European historical for-
mation of these concepts suggests that he 
uses “European concepts” in just such a 
shorthand manner. To draw a distinction 
between a concept and its use is howe-
ver crucial, as there is no necessary con-
nection between Europe and these con-
cepts. The use of concepts is historically 
contingent, and WANG is mistaken if he 
takes some verbalized uses in 19th cen-
tury European history – however domi-
nant and infl uential they may have been 
– as a defi nitive marker for the quality 
of ‘being European’. For one thing, this 
is so because any so-called “European 
concept” is at best the result of a histori-
cal process that is itself based on various 
power differentials and readily traceable 
to earlier verbalized uses in more speci-
fi c locations. Given WANG’s skepticism of 
the concept of state, why does he not talk 
of the “Italian” or “Florentine” concept 
of the state, say Machiavelli’s il stato, 
and oppose Italocentrism rather than Eu-
rocentrism? Put provocatively, it seems 
as if talk of “European concepts” turns 
Europe into a “static historical form” in 
no less defi cient a manner than 19th cen-
65 WANG, 2007, p. 29.
tury European scholars have done when 
conceptualizing Asia. 
Although the notion of ‘travelling 
concepts’ is currently championed by 
many, I would think of it as a useful no-
tion only if it is to say that concepts tra-
vel inasmuch as their use does. Whether 
something counts as a use of a travelled 
concept (whose meaning is thereby con-
fi rmed, altered or changed) or as a use of 
some other new concept is in each case 
a contested and inconclusive matter and 
certainly subject to argument. Anybo-
dy of course is free to argue that some 
use of a concept is linked to some con-
ceptualized geographical region, or, for 
that matter, to some culture or tradition. 
If, however, such a link is argued to be 
conclusive and henceforth unbridgeable 
with the consequence that concepts are 
opposed or endorsed on that basis only, 
then one risks to buy into the use of the-
se concepts as mere shibboleths (surely 
a ‘Hebrew concept’?). Concepts thus 
easily become the esoteric prerogative 
of some guardians of a presumed tradi-
tion, culture or civilization, as if the use 
of a concept by an ‘outsider’ would be at 
all impossible or, if possible, would be 
inadequate. More often than not, talk of 
“European concepts” merely means to 
offer abridged arguments and to cover 
political agendas. In WANG’s re-imagina-
tion of Asia and Europe, the one political 
agenda of Left Schmittianism is fairly 
explicit. But arguably there is a second, 
more implicit political agenda which 
is manifest in arguments drawing on a 
presumed Chinese tradition or Confuci-
an culture. How the two political agen-
das relate to each other is unclear. That 
WANG asserts a diminished validity to the 
concept of Asia while re-imagining it in 
the form of Confucian East Asia or China 
should receive further critical attention.
WANG’s re-imagination of Asia and 
Europe were to profi t – I would venture 
to suggest – from getting rid of anti-Eu-
rocentrist traces on the conceptual level, 
lest his rightly criticized “culturalisms, 
statisms, and theories of civilization” 
risk re-entering through the backdoor. In 
that sense, if there ever is to be a Chi-
nese superpower, the sought terms of 
criticism, though likely to be expressive 
of and questioned for location-specifi c 
genealogies, are in political argument 
profi tably understood as employing con-
cepts which are neither the prerogative 
nor the burden of any conceptualized 
geographical region, civilization, cul-
ture, or tradition. If anything, the con-
cepts on which terms of criticism draw 
should be universally available. To pro-
mote such critical use perhaps is what is 
required if the meaning of ‘being Asian’ 
or ‘being European’ in the 21st century 
is not to repeat the inadequacies of the 
insular politics in the past.
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